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This chapter provides an overview and measurement of distortions to agricultural incentives 
in Senegal from 1961 through 2004. Senegalese agriculture is unusually specialized in just 
three products: groundnuts, rice and millet. Groundnuts have remained Senegal’s premier 
export, rice remains the principle importable food, and millet is the principal food crop. Our 
data also include cotton, primarily because of its role elsewhere in the region. Several other 
products are of significance to particular communities within Senegal, but are much less 
important at the national level. These include both exportables such as fish, import-competing 
products such as meat or maize, and a range of items with little international trade such as 
sorghum and cowpeas. Fertilizers also play an important role, including phosphates which are 
exported as well as nitrogenous compounds which are imported.  
Most descriptions of Senegal begin by noting that it was the favored capital of French 
West Africa, with Dakar as the French center for colonial administration and industry. This 
status led to an unusual economic structure, with a very large government and service sector 
relative to the country’s size. Adjustment after Independence in 1960 was slow and painful. 
Real GDP in purchasing-power parity terms fell by over 20 percent during the 1960s and 
1970s (Appendix Figure 1). This long decline ended in 1980, when Senegal became the 
world’s first country to enter a World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program. 
Incomes rose in the 1980s, fell again from 1988 to 1994, and have risen steadily since then. 
Policy changes were spread out over more than a decade, but since 1993 the country has 
enjoyed more than a decade of sustained growth, fueled by an exchange-rate devaluation in 
1994 and subsequent aid flows.  
A remarkable feature of Senegal’s long decline and eventual turnaround is its relative 
steadiness. There was no growth collapse, and internal conflict was limited to a long but 
relatively small insurgency in the Casamance region which did not break out until after the 
decline had ended. For most Senegalese, relative peace and stability prevailed over a period 
that required wrenching changes in every aspect of Senegalese life, a situation that could 
easily have involved widespread violence and macroeconomic instability. Instead, the 
restructuring of Senegal’s inefficient and inequitable colonial economic institutions was   2
spread out over more than 40 years. Many challenges remain and growth reversals may again 
occur, but the country now has a much more open and competitive economic structure and a 
more favorable outlook for the future.  
The focus of this chapter is on Senegal’s own policy choices. Other countries’ policies 
are taken as given, considered to be part of Senegal’s market environment. France has been 
particularly important, of course, through both fiscal transfers and market prices. French 
decisions set the starting point for Senegalese policy in 1960, and heavily influenced the 
opportunity costs for any subsequent reforms. Those opportunity costs are measured using 
Senegal’s actual border prices even though these include European trade preferences and 
other countries’ export subsidies, to capture the net effect of all influences on Senegal’s 
market opportunities.  
We focus on net effects within Senegal as well, treating each commodity category as 
a single market. In fact, Senegalese policy involved significant discrimination within markets, 
using quota allocations, fiscal transfers and cross-subsidies to favor particular groups such as 
marabout leaders in the groundnut basin. These cross-subsidies do not appear when 
measuring the aggregate average distortion from world prices. They may have been necessary 
for political stability, but they were probably costly for economic growth, making the reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s even more valuable for future growth than the estimates in our data 
would imply.   
 
 
Economic and structural change since 1955 
 
 
The post-1955-56 period… was characterized by a general decline of 
output in (most) major industrial groups.  
         Diawa-Mory Traore (1969, pp. 37-38)   
 
Senegal’s economic structure was built by French colonials in the 19
th and early 20
th century. 
The country served as the administrative and logistical hub for French West Africa, exporting 
groundnuts and groundnut oil to metropolitan France while importing low-quality rice from 
French colonies in Southeast Asia. Revenues from this system were generally repatriated to 
France rather than reinvested within Senegal, so that even before Independence the country 
was in serious economic difficulty. And despite the country’s large urban population, 
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agriculture continued to employ the vast majority of workers, so living standards for the poor 
were determined mainly by the country’s farm productivity. 
From 1960 through the mid-1980s, Senegal’s total food output fluctuated but did not 
grow at all, while population more than doubled so that food output per capita declined by 
more than 50 percent. Since the reforms of the 1980s, total agricultural output has doubled, 
but population has doubled again so per capita production has been about constant. In Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, total output has grown much faster, producing much less decline 
in output per capita than has occurred in Senegal (Appendix Figure 2).  
The consequences of stagnant farm productivity for Senegal’s trade are noteworthy. 
Exports of groundnut products grew briefly in the 1970s and again in the late 1980s but in 
each case have fallen back to their 1961 level. An expansion of the local groundnut-oil 
industry virtually eliminated the export of raw groundnuts in the late 1960s, but the sector as 
a whole did not grow in nominal US dollars, and so declined in real terms (Figure 1 and 
Appendix Figure 3). Stagnation of this sector is often attributed to limited demand on world 
markets, but the lack of aggregate growth despite local value added suggests that supply 
constraints were also important. At prevailing prices and productivity levels, farmers have 
been unable to devote more land or labor to any export, and the country as a whole has 
survived (albeit with high malnutrition rates) only thanks to steadily increasing food imports.   
Net imports of all kinds can be a desirable counterpart to aid and capital inflows. In 
aggregate, they grew very rapidly in the 1970s and again from 1997, but food imports have 
followed a trend of their own, steadily increasing since the late 1970s. Only a small fraction 
of this trend is due to increasing imports of rice. Increasing imports of other cereal grains add 
to the trend, and since 1989 there have been even larger increases in the imports of other 
foods. In sum, stagnation of local agricultural production has led Senegal to devote a large 
fraction of available foreign exchange to food imports (Figure 1), with continued poverty 
allowing very limited improvement in dietary quality. 
Table 1 presents the FAO’s food balance sheet for Senegal, in their earliest (1961) 
and latest (2003) available years. The first pair of columns shows self-sufficiency ratios, and 
the second shows dietary composition. Cereals continue to dominate the diet, providing over 
60 percent of calories, of which the share supplied by local production has declined from 0.73 
to 0.43. Starchy roots account for a small and falling fraction of the food supply. The most 
unusual aspect of the Senegalese diet is its extraordinarily high consumption of vegetable 
oils, with lower-cost soybean oil replacing much of the groundnut oil that had been the focus 
of colonial development policy.   
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Most African countries have significantly increased their cropped area since the early 
1960s, under pressure of rural population growth, but in Senegal there has been almost no 
increase (Appendix Figure 4). One reason why Senegalese farmers have not undertaken 
similar expansion into previously unattractive areas is that they lack profitable technologies 
with which to do so. That lack of profitable expansion opportunities is due in part to the 
country’s unusual focus on groundnuts and millet. Some combination of a legume such as 
groundnuts with a cereal crop such as millet is typical of rainfed systems around the world, 
but Senegal’s focus on these particular crops reflects the country’s political history as much 
as its agronomic conditions. Groundnuts were deliberately imposed on farmers by the French 
in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, while millet became the dominant food grain by default 
due to the lack of investment in farmers’ alternatives.  
Raising incomes without a change of crop species is difficult. Some farmers are 
turning from groundnuts to cowpeas, and have recently also been turning from millet to 
maize. These other crops are widely grown in countries whose agronomic conditions are 
similar to Senegal’s, but Senegalese farmers have had only limited access to appropriate new 
varieties that would stimulate substitution. The only crop with significant yield growth has 
been rice (Appendix Figure 5), which is grown under irrigation. Rice has benefited from a 
relatively high level of public research (Fisher, Masters and Sidibe 2000), but total irrigable 
area is small and limited. The major rainfed crops have a larger area under cultivation and 
probably more opportunity for expansion if only farmers had access to more-productive 
technologies.  
Fertilizer use is a key contributor to sustainable crop productivity growth. Senegal is a 
significant exporter of phosphates, but it imports nitrogenous fertilizers. The value of 
phosphate exports rose suddenly in the mid-1970s, but declined steadily thereafter (Appendix 
Figure 6). Consumption of fertilizers grew throughout the 1970s, but was not associated with 
significant crop yield increases and quickly fell back to earlier levels. Since 1990, however, 
there has been a decade of steadily increasing fertilizer consumption, helping to lay a 
foundation for sustainable crop yield growth in the more-competitive farming systems.   
 
 
Government policy in the colonial era 
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French colonial policies gave Senegal a distinctive social history. One key legacy is Africa’s 
oldest tradition of electoral democracy. In 1848, France gave all Senegalese the right to vote 
in its national elections. This was the first universal-suffrage vote in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
it resulted in the first African representative to a European parliament. Those elections may 
have had little practical influence on the colonial policies of the day, but could have helped 
establish the culture of representative government which Senegal has enjoyed since 
independence. Despite the political stress imposed by low and falling per capita incomes, 
independent Senegal is one of the very few African countries to have experienced repeated 
contested elections and only peaceful transfers of power, from Léopold Sédar Senghor to his 
chosen successor Abdou Diouf in 1981, and then to longtime opposition party leader 
Abdoulaye Wade in 2000.   
A second key legacy of French colonialism is Senegal’s unusually high level of 
urbanization. From 1902, Dakar was developed as the capital for all of French West Africa, 
with a far larger urban population than the Senegalese economy could efficiently support. At 
Independence, 32 percent of the population was urbanized, more than twice the average for 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
1 The city’s administrative role left independent Senegal with an 
extraordinarily large civil service. The national government absorbed almost all of the 
functionaries who had previously governed French West Africa and then the Mali Federation, 
doubling the state operating budget during the transition period from 1957 to 1961 
(Schumacher 1975, p. 123).   
If the city of Dakar had been developed for commercial or industrial reasons one 
might expect Dakar’s size to be a source of economic dynamism, but France’s pacte colonial 
severely constrained local growth opportunities. Boone (1992) describes in detail how French 
trading houses were established and protected by colonial authorities. Their traite was a 
closed circuit of trade between France and its colonies, exporting groundnuts in exchange for 
high-priced French manufactures and consumer goods, including the lowest-quality broken 
rice from Southeast Asian colonies. After World War II, some import-substituting industries 
were established in Dakar, competing with French products but heavily protected against 
imports from elsewhere, with market shares dictated by negotiation among the trading houses 
and with the colonial government. The development of these subsidized industries imposed a 
double burden on the Senegalese economy, first by reducing the savings available for any 
                                                 
1 By comparison, Ghana’s urbanization rate at the time was also above average, but still only 23 percent. Within 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the next-highest urbanization rate was for Congo-Brazzaville (World Bank 2006). Only 
three countries in the entire world with similar or lower per capita incomes in PPP terms had higher urbanization 
rates: Egypt, Syria and Romania.  
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more efficient investment at that time, and then later by requiring massive adjustment costs 
when subsidies were removed. 
  Within agriculture, the country has a long history with groundnuts and millet. There 
was a long rise in groundnut production from the late 19
th century until Independence, when 
it began to fall and was replaced by millet for own consumption. Now millet itself is being 
replaced by other foods in the 21
st century (Appendix Figure 7).  
An important question in Senegalese economic history is why the colonial 
government chose to focus on groundnuts, and why that focus proved to be so durable. 
Bonnefond and Couty (1991) suggest a number of contributing factors. One was the late-19
th 
century availability of emancipated slaves, who had been freed in 1848 and could be put to 
the task under the leadership of local marabouts in what became the groundnut basin. A 
second was the completion of a railroad from that region to the sea. With abundant labor, an 
outlet to trade, and few other alternatives at hand, African farmers’ groundnut production 
grew steadily throughout the colonial era, from an average of 31 thousand metric tons per 
year in 1886-1890 to its eventual peak after Independence. Growth was fastest in the early 
years, with production expanding by an average of 7.5 percent per year from 1885 until 1930. 
Growth slowed after 1930, partly due to a slowdown in area expansion, but also because 
there was no further productivity growth: average yields were 870 mt/ha in the 1930s, and 
have fluctuated around that level ever since.    
France’s 19
th century investment in transportation and marketing infrastructure, which 
facilitated agricultural exports, unlocked the potential of inland areas to supply the coasts. 
Groundnut was an attractive product to export, but without colonial restrictions farmers 
would probably have been much more diversified, particularly if the alternative included 
government policies to support other crops. French colonial policy focused on groundnuts, 
however, and so they remained the only possible source of cash income for most rainfed 
farmers.   
 
 
Agricultural policy since independence 
 
 
After Independence in 1960 Senegal’s political leadership used the colonial-era bureaucracy 
for a sequence of “socialist” and “nationalist” initiatives, to replace French entities with 
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Senegalese ones. Schumacher (1975) and Boone (1992) describe this process in detail, 
focusing on agriculture and industry, respectively.    
For agriculture, the single most important institutional change was the introduction, in 
January of 1960, of the Office de Commercialisation Agricole (OCA), a state-owned 
enterprise created to replace the small group of French trading firms which dominated the 
circuit of groundnut exports and imports of rice and farm inputs. In particular, the OCA was 
given a legal monopoly over groundnut marketing, to be exercised by licensing either private 
buyers or, preferably, one of the state-promoted rural cooperatives. It was also charged with 
arranging for increased imports of farm inputs, using its legal monopoly over the groundnut 
trade to recoup operating loans to farmers for the purchase of those inputs. The OCA was 
also given a monopoly over rice imports, which it allocated to local traders with some limited 
controls over resale prices.   Loans were administered by another new entity, the Banque 
Sénégalaise de Développement (BSD), in collaboration with the rural development services 
which were reorganized into a set of Centres Régionaux de l’Assistance pour le 
Développement (CRADs) and local cooperatives.   
The OCA-BSD-CRAD-cooperative system was able to maintain the groundnut circuit 
in the first few years of independence, avoiding the most likely alternative which would have 
been a sudden collapse of trade volumes and a period of extreme hardship. Replacing French 
traders with state-owned enterprises kept trade flowing, but the whole enterprise was almost 
certainly unsustainable. Margins were shrinking and, within the marketing chain, agents at 
each stage found opportunities for diversion: individual farmers against their cooperatives, 
cooperative managers against their lenders, loan officers against the OCA. As detailed by 
Schumacher (1975), similar problems had plagued colonial administrators. Instead of 
liberalizing, however, the new government responded by attempting to eliminate private 
markets entirely, and attempting to use administrative means to control corruption within the 
bureaucracy. 
In 1966-67, the OCA was replaced by an agency with an even broader mandate: the 
Office Nationale de Cooperation et d’Assistance au Developpement (ONCAD), charged with 
input distribution and transport as well as groundnut marketing. ONCAD then lasted for 
about a decade, before being itself dissolved in 1980. The pace of change was dictated in part 
by France’s willingness to support the Senegalese structures it had helped create. But 
decolonization coincided with European integration, so that France’s trade preferences had to 
be extended to Europe as a whole. These trade preferences, and some fiscal transfers, were 
governed by a series of agreements among European countries with their former colonies: 
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first the Yaoundé Convention of 1963, soon followed by the Lomé Convention and now the 
Cotonou Agreement which took effect in 2002. It is not clear whether these agreements 
improved or worsened conditions for Senegal, or what the counter-factual might have been. 
In this study, we take this external environment as given. 
By the end of the 1970s, the Senegalese economy was among the most distorted in 
West Africa. In 1980, Senegal became the first of the region’s countries to start a World 
Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Program, but the reform process was slow. In the rice 
market, for example, a comparison of government interventions across 12 West African 
countries in 1979 gave Senegal a score of 0.5 on a zero-to-9 scale, where 9 is “generally 
competitive, with market determined prices” (Randolph 1994, Table 2). The only other 
country to score below 2 was Mauritania, with a score of 0.7. By 1993, after more than a 
decade of reform, Senegal had raised its score to 3.9 but it still had the most highly controlled 
market of the region (Randolph 1994, Table 5). Jammeh (1987) provides a detailed 
description of the reforms undertaken in the 1980s. 
In retrospect, what is most notable is how many of the changes introduced under the 
“New Industrial Policy” between 1986 and 1988 were subsequently reversed. By 1993, just 
prior to the region-wide devaluation of the CFA Franc, Senegalese tariff rates were very high 
(75 percent on consumer goods produced locally, 45 percent on other consumer goods). 
Government limited competition among domestic firms as well, with conventions speciales 
protecting privately-owned monopolies in sugar, cement and petroleum as well as continued 
government control of rice imports, groundnut processing and the ports (IMF 1995, p. 29).  
 
 
Price comparisons and the measurement of distortions 
 
 
To measure distortions over time in a consistent way, we use the methodology of Anderson et 
al. (2008). The focus is on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between 
domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. The method relies on historical 
observations of prices paid or received in foreign trade, combined with a set of assumptions 
about the marketing margins that would have applied. Since it is not possible to understand 
the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s 
methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including 
distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it also generates estimates of distortions in 
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non-agricultural sectors for comparison. We compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) 
for various farm industries, and we also provide an estimate of NRAs for nonagricultural 
tradables, which is compared with that of agricultural tradables via the calculation of a 
Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA). 
Our analysis does not consider interventions in input prices. For Senegal those are 
likely to have been very small relative to distortions to prices of outputs, and in any case we 
have insufficient observations to provide useful estimates. Thus, our results hinge on simple 
price comparisons in each product market, net of our assumptions about marketing margins 
and our estimate (again following the project’s methodology outlined in Anderson et al. 
2008) of exchange rate distortions in each year. 
 
Groundnut prices and marketing margins 
 
Our approach to the groundnut market focuses on the opportunity cost of the raw nuts (in 
their shells), prior to processing into groundnut oil. This measures the NRA for the 
production of the groundnuts themselves. We tried to obtain satisfactory data on processing 
costs and market prices for groundnut oil, so as to measure the nominal protection afforded to 
the operations of SONACOS, the parastatal groundnut processor. This proved impossible for 
us to do because of the lack of transparency in SONACOS, which since 2003 has been slowly 
privatized under intense political scrutiny. In January 2007, SONACOS was renamed Suneor 
and is majority owned by Advens, a private consortium. Looking back over the history of 
SONACOS, it is clear from the pricing of raw nuts that its operations have been highly 
subsidized at the expense of farmers, taxpayers and oil consumers. One estimate for 
marketing year 2001-02 suggests that, given all of SONACOS’s procurement costs, its 
tradable inputs were subsidized at a rate of about 23 percent, which more than offset the 8.5 
percent premiums it paid on nontradable factors such as labor, and was much larger than the 
7.7 percent implicit subsidy that SONACOS received from protection on it sales. The net 
effect was a substantial transfer to SONACOS, amounting to 20 percent of the firm’s market 
revenue (République du Sénégal 2003). In the absence of a time-series for such operational 
data, however, we cannot determine the full extent of distortions in the processing sector.  
Our price comparison method starts with the unit values of Senegal’s raw nut exports, 
obtained from FAO file data, and compares them with estimated farm-gate selling prices 
reported by a sequence of published sources for various periods of time. The farm-gate prices 
are from Boone (1992, p. 200) for 1959 and 1966-79, Kelly and Delgado (1991, p. 104) for 
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1980-89, and the IMF (2005, p.42) for 1997-04, with linear interpolations for the periods 
between those observations. These published sources report prices from a variety of official 
publications and official file data. We could find no contemporary publication or file data 
with a complete time series for the entire 1960-2004 period.   
Since the FAO unit values are measured at Dakar whereas the farmgate prices are 
paid in the groundnut basin, the observed price difference between them includes transport 
and marketing costs. The price distortion due to trade restrictions is the observed price 
difference minus our estimate of what those costs would be in the absence of government 
trade restrictions.  Our best estimate of this margin is borrowed from Kite (1993, p.10), who 
quotes a margin from the Groundnut Basin to Dakar for competitive traders of cereal grains 
equal to 17 percent of the farmgate price. This is likely to be an upper bound for the cost of 
groundnut marketing, since at least some of the margin would be a per ton charge for 
transport, and the groundnuts have a higher value than grains. If the margin was lower, 
implied rates of taxation would be greater. To proceed conservatively, we apply this same 
percentage margin to this crop for all years.   
In addition, the FAO unit values refer to much higher grade nuts than the national 
average. An adjustment for quality differences must be made as well as the adjustment for 
transport costs mentioned above. We could not find an independent estimate for the historical 
market value of this quality differential, and so we used a conservative calibration approach. 
We sought the percentage quality differential which, when applied over all years, resulted in 
the smallest level of taxation, given our observation that there was no period of sustained 
groundnut-production subsidies. This approach is conservative in the sense that it might 
understate the absolute value of taxation, if the market value of the quality premium for 
exported nuts were actually smaller than our calibrated value. The calibration procedure 
yields an estimated price premium of 35 percent for export-quality as opposed to the national 
average quality, which we consider plausible. One important aspect of this result is that it 
includes the policy rent paid by European importers due to trade preferences for Senegalese 
country of origin, in addition to European consumers’ valuation of the product’s intrinsic 
quality. From Senegal’s point of view, however, this policy rent can be taken as given, 
serving as a marginal incentive just like any other type of willingness to pay.  
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Rice prices and marketing margins 
 
Our approach to rice is similar to that for groundnuts, in that we compare FAO file data on 
the unit values of Senegal’s rice imports against published estimates of farmgate prices, net 
of our estimates for the marketing margins and quality premia that would be paid for these 
transactions in the absence of trade restrictions. We start with import unit values from the 
FAO, which refer principally to broken rice from Southeast Asia. We then compare these 
with farmgate prices reported by Randolph (1997, p. 84) for 1961-95, plus IMF (2005, p. 42) 
for 1997-04. In this case there is only one missing value, for1996, which we interpolate 
linearly from the 1995 and 1997 observations. As with groundnuts, we could find no 
publication or data source with a continuous time series.   
For transport costs between Dakar and rice farmers, again we use the 17 percent 
estimate of Kite (1993, p.10), and apply it uniformly to all years. For product quality 
adjustments, we note that imported rice is usually of a much lower quality than that produced 
domestically in Senegal. In the absence of an independent estimate for the historical market 
value of this quality differential, we used a similar calibration approach as with groundnuts. 
Our goal in this case was to find the uniform percentage quality differential which, when 
applied over the entire period, is consistent with the policy observation of approximately zero 
net taxation or subsidies over the decade of the 1960s. This calibration procedure yields an 
estimated discount for imported rice of 30 percent, which we find consistent with anecdotal 
evidence.   
An important caveat is that this quality discount is calibrated to fit historical prices, 
and it is possible that quality values have not only fluctuated but also trended over the years. 
(We would have no such trend error in the groundnuts case, since that calibration was based 
on observations about policy over the entire period.) But it turns out that the 30 percent 
quality differential calibrated for the 1960s is also consistent with no non-tariff barriers to 
rice traders after liberalization in 1995, which gives us some confidence in the stability of this 
parameter over time.  
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Millet prices and marketing margins 
 
Millet is included in this study to represent the large fraction of Senegalese agriculture which 
is produced and consumed primarily within rural areas. This basic food is actively traded 
across short distances, but its low value-to-weight ratio limits the extent of long-distance 
transport and international trade. This grain is a necessity for the rural poor, but effective 
market demand is limited as higher-income consumers prefer foods that require less 
preparation time or have other attractive characteristics. There is no price distortion due to 
government intervention. On the other hand, there is also little public investment in new 
technology or other drivers of productivity growth. We treat this product as nontradable 
internationally.  
Millet is normally much less valuable than rice, but it appears to have become more 
costly than rice in the past decade (Appendix Figure 8). This switch in national-average 
farmgate prices is probably due mainly to differences in the location of production, as rice is 
increasingly abundant in irrigated and urban areas while millet remains in the dryland regions 
where it is grown for local consumption. 
   
Quantities produced  
 
Quantities produced are used for the computation of aggregate NRAs. Weights are based on 
FAO estimates of total production valued at undistorted prices. Rice production grew rapidly 
from 1973 to 1990, when real farmgate prices fluctuated with no trend, and then production 
stayed constant after 1990 even as real farmgate prices fell sharply. This suggests significant 
shifts in the rice supply curve, due perhaps to public investment in genetic improvement and 
infrastructure, especially for irrigation. In contrast, estimated production of both groundnuts 
and millet has trended down in recent years, despite roughly constant real prices (Appendix 
Figures 8 and 9). 
 
Exchange rates and macroeconomic distortions 
 
Distortions to the market for foreign exchange have been small in Senegal relative to other 
African countries. Like most other former French colonies in Africa, Senegal has never had 
its own monetary policy. After Independence the colonial currency, the franc des Colonies 
Françaises d'Afrique (CFA Franc) was simply renamed the franc de la Communauté 
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Financière de l'Afrique using the same acronym and the same fixed rate of 50 CFAF per 
French Franc. Convertibility was guaranteed by capital inflows from France, underwriting the 
balance-of-payments deficit of the CFA region with the rest of the world. Senegal accounted 
for a very small fraction of these inflows, but the total payment needed to support the 
currency became increasingly unsustainable and on 12 January 1994 the region’s currency 
was devalued to 100 CFAF per French Franc. It has remained convertible at that valuation 
ever since, switching its peg to the Euro in January 1999.   
The real exchange rate consequences for Senegal of the CFAF’s fixed nominal rate 
are illustrated in Figure 2(a). The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) shown there is the 
IMF’s measure of differential inflation between Senegal and its trading partners, after 
conversion between currencies at official exchange rates. What is most noticeable is the 
relative stability of Senegal’s real exchange rate. The country did have faster inflation than its 
trading partners during the 1981-86 period, resulting in an appreciation of its REER totaling 
about 24 percent over five years, but then it had slower inflation and a depreciation until 1994 
that returned the REER back to its 1981 level. There was only one year of appreciation after 
the devaluation of 1994, followed by another five years of low inflation and REER 
depreciation, before a slight upturn in the REER in 2001-2003.    
Clearly, Senegal has not experienced the same inflation-induced overvaluation as 
many other countries – including many of its neighbors in the CFA zone. Indeed, relative to 
other countries, Senegal’s macroeconomic policies caused the country’s price level at official 
exchange rates to gain only about 30 percent in value in the decade before the 50 percent 
devaluation imposed by France. This limited degree of overvaluation is shown in Figure 2(a) 
by the difference between the IMF’s REER and the estimated Equilibrium Real Exchange 
Rate (EqRER), which is the econometric result of an exercise conducted by Elbadawi (2006), 
using a worldwide panel of REERs and their determinants to estimate what each country’s 
REER would be without the influence of short-term fluctuations in unsustainable fiscal and 
monetary policies. The difference between the REER and the EqRER is an estimate of RER 
misalignment (RERmis), with an increase in RERmis reflecting an increasingly overvalued 
currency. The 1994 devaluation much more than compensated for any of Senegal’s own 
macroeconomic imbalances, although the overshooting was quickly eroded and by 2004 the 
RERmis index was back to where it started in 1980.   
For a consistent measure of policy-induced distortions in agriculture, instead of RER 
misalignment we will use the information implied by the Easterly (2006) data on black 
market premiums paid for the CFAF in parallel markets. These data, reported in Figure 2(b), 
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show that despite the French effort to support the CFAF, a small degree of excess demand for 
foreign currency prevailed from 1960 through 1970, and again in most years from 1978 
through 1993, and also in 2002-2004. The project’s approach (Anderson et al. 2008) is to 
compute an undistorted marginal value of foreign exchange earned or saved as a blended 
average between the black market premium and the official exchange rate. This is shown in 
Figure 2(b) as the dashed line, roughly half-way between the other two. Since the black 




The net effect of government policies on agricultural incentives are summarized by the prices 
in Figure 3 and the NRAs in Figure 4 and Table 2. During the early 1960s, groundnut 
production was moderately taxed (and groundnut processors thereby helped), while rice 
production was slightly subsidized (and rice consumers thereby harmed). This pattern of 
protection, restricting both exports and imports, imposed a moderate level of anti-trade bias, 
which widened considerably over the 1970s. For groundnuts and cotton, export prices rose 
much faster than the farmgate price in the 1970s, then fell in the 1980s before rising again 
after 1995. Domestic prices followed the trend, but with much greater stability. A similar 
story applies to rice. In both cases, domestic prices were institutionally fixed, and year-to-
year changes in distortions were driven by changes in foreign prices. During the brief period 
of high import prices in 1974-75, rice producers were slightly taxed to the benefit of 
consumers in contrast to the twenty years thereafter when lower international prices resulted 
in a very high level of protection for rice producers. Both of these were largely eliminated 
after 1995, although we estimate that there remained moderate taxation of groundnut and 
cotton producers. There has been very little short-term correlation between domestic and 
foreign prices until the experience with groundnuts after 2000 (Figure 3).  
When combined with the zero distortion to the price of nontradable millet (whose 
share of the value of farm production has been in the range of 15-30 percent), the overall 
NRA for the four covered products has fluctuated from less than 15 percent taxation in the 
1960s to more than 30 percent taxation in the 1970s and early 1980s, before turning to 
slightly positive support in the latter 1980s when international national prices were extremely 
low and then settling at around 10 percent taxation in the past decade or so.  
For other farm products (roughly one-third of overall farm production), in the absence 
of commodity-specific data we guesstimate that 30 percent is import-competing with an 
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average NRA of 20 percent from import restrictions, another 30 percent is exportable with an 
average NRA of -10 percent from export restrictions, and 40 percent is nontradable with no 
distortions. That yields an average NRA for non-covered farm products of around 3 percent 
when the distortions to exchange rates also are taken into account, and hence a slightly less 
negative NRA average for the entire sector than for just covered products (upper half of 
Table 3).   
The lower half of Table 3 compares the NRAs for the tradable part of the agricultural 
sector with our guesstimate of the NRA facing producers of tradable nonagricultural goods. 
For the latter we assume that two-thirds of the value of production of those goods are import-
competing with an average NRA of 20 percent from import restrictions and one-third is 
exportable with an average NRA of -10 percent from export restrictions. That yields an 
average NRA for nonagricultural tradables of around 7 percent when the distortions to 
exchange rates also are taken into account, and hence a more negative RRA than NRA for 
agricultural tradables (lower half of Table 3). That is, this guesstimate for assistance to 
nonfarm producers worsens our estimate of the anti-agricultural bias in Senegal. As can be 
seen from the annual data in Figure 5, that bias was present for all but 3 years in the period 
from independence to 2004. 
Finally, the bottom three rows of Table 3 show what some the key indicators would 
have been if exchange rate distortions had not been included. The NRAs and RRA change 
little, suggesting that policy measure was not a significant part of the distortions to 






Senegal’s groundnut and rice trade policies have maintained relatively stable domestic prices 
for these two products. This has had the effect of providing an anti-trade bias within the 
agricultural sector. It also meant an increase during the 1970s and a decrease in the latter 
1980s in the country’s anti-agricultural bias. More recently, the completion of agricultural 
market reforms, towards liberalized rice trade in the late 1990s and the privatization of 
groundnut processing in the current decade, have led to a somewhat smaller level of 
distortion now that prior to the mid-1980s.  
     16
The unwinding of Senegal’s colonial institutions has been among the slowest in 
Africa, extending over more than 40 years. Senegalese incomes fell significantly over the 
first half of that period, but there was no sudden growth collapse and no country-wide civil 
strife. A continuous practice of electoral democracy has been maintained, with peaceful 
transfers of political power. This remarkable political achievement, together with the 
establishment of new institutions for competitive markets in agriculture and throughout the 
economy, provides a potentially very strong foundation for sustained economic growth in the 
future. It will take decades for the country to overcome the legacy of widespread malnutrition 
and low agricultural productivity, but with open trade policies and macroeconomic stability, 
there is now the opportunity for new investments in both the private and public sectors that 
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 Figure 1: Net merchandise trade, Senegal, 1961 to 2004  
 






















Note:  Value for total merchandise trade in 2004 was -US$1,590 m. (not shown). 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations from FAO (2006) data.  
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Figure 2: Foreign exchange rates, Senegal, 1960 to 2005 
 


































   
 
Note: Author’s estimate of the undistorted rate is based on the methodology of Anderson et 
al. (2008). 
Sources: Official exchange rates from IFS (2006), black market/parallel rates from Easterly 
(2006), RER indexes from Elbadawi (2006) 
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Notes: Wholesale prices are based on official farmgate prices plus a domestic marketing margin; undistorted 




Note: Data shown are in real CFAF at 2004 prices, deflated by CPI from IMF International 
Financial Statistics. 
Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
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 Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
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Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 
because assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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Source: Author’s spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
   Table 1:  Food balance sheet data, Senegal, 1961 and 2003 
 
     Self-sufficiency ratio    Dietary composition 
     (Production/Utilization)    (Percent  of  calories) 
     1961  2003    1961  2003 
Total number of calories             2,290        2,374  
  Cereals - excluding beer  0.73  0.43    60.6  60.4 
   Wheat       5.2  9.2 
   Rice (milled equivalent)  0.34 0.15    20.4  32.0 
   Maize  0.59 0.66    4.6  4.5 
   Millet  1.00 1.00    23.1  9.6 
   Sorghum  0.95 1.00    6.8  5.1 
 Starchy  roots  0.94  0.83   5.7  2.3 
   Cassava  1.00 0.99    5.0  1.9 
  Sugar and sweeteners  0.00  0.61    8.5  6.0 
 Pulses  0.98  0.96   1.4  1.2 
 Groundnuts  (shelled  equiv.)  1.62  1.00   3.4  2.1 
 Vegetable  oils  4.15  0.50   8.3  15.1 
   Groundnut oil  5.03 1.56    6.9  5.0 
   Soyabean oil         7.7 
   Palm oil  0.55 0.17    1.2  1.3 
 Vegetables  0.55  0.88   0.7  1.6 
   Tomatoes  0.12 0.55    0.3  0.1 
   Onions  0.43 0.62    0.2  0.6 
   Vegetables, Other  0.97 0.98    0.2  1.0 
 Fruits    0.70  0.83   0.6  0.7 
   Bananas  0.91 0.36    0.0  0.1 
 Meat  0.99  0.92   2.8  3.2 
   Bovine   0.98 0.97    1.8  1.0 
   Poultry   0.97 0.84    0.1  1.1 
 Milk  (excluding  butter)  0.78  0.48   2.4  2.2 
 Eggs  0.88  0.99   0.1  0.4 
 Fish,  seafood  na  na   1.5  2.3 
Source: Author's calculations from FAOSTAT (2006) Food Balance Sheet data. 
Note:  Self-sufficiency ratio is computed as production plus stock change,  
  divided by total utilization (labeled as "domestic supply" by the FAO). 2 
 




    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
           
Exportables 
a, b -19.9 -17.3 -44.6 -47.8 -45.4  -7.7  -5.2 -14.2 -20.8 
Groundnuts  -19.9 -17.3 -44.4 -47.7 -44.7  -7.4  -5.0 -13.7 -21.1 
Cotton  n.a.  n.a. -47.9 -50.6 -55.7 -15.0 -11.1 -26.5 -10.0 
           
Import-competing products 
a, b 9.5 -1.4 -2.3 30.5  6.6 99.4  117.1 -2.1  5.9 
Rice  9.5 -1.4 -2.3 30.5  6.6 99.4  117.1 -2.1  5.9 
           
Nontradable 
a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Millet  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
           
Total of covered products 
a -14.6 -11.7 -33.2 -33.7 -30.3  5.2  6.7  -9.9 -12.1 
Dispersion of covered products 
c    20.3 16.1 33.5 44.5 38.2 58.8 67.1 14.3 18.6 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
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Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, Senegal, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered  products  -14.6 -11.7 -33.2 -33.7 -30.3  5.2  6.7  -9.9 -12.1 
Non-covered  products    3.2 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.4 3.2 3.0 3.2 
All agricultural products  -9.3  -7.2  -22.4  -22.7  -20.5  4.7  5.6  -6.1  -7.5 
Trade bias index
a -0.32 -0.27 -0.47 -0.53 -0.47 -0.42 -0.42 -0.20 -0.30 
           
Assistance to just tradables:           
   All agricultural tradables  -12.7  -10.5  -30.9  -31.1  -28.0  8.2  9.7  -8.1  -10.9 
   All non-agricultural tradables  11.1  11.6  10.3  11.1  9.1  12.4  10.9  9.8  11.4 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b -21.4 -19.8 -37.4 -37.9 -34.1  -3.6  -1.0 -16.3 -20.1 
           
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:           
  NRA, all agric. products  -8.2 -5.8 -22.2 -22.0 -21.0 6.6 6.2 -6.2 -6.6
  Trade bias index
a -0.29 -0.22 -0.47 -0.51 -0.49 -0.36 -0.40 -0.21 -0.25
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
b -19.3 -16.8 -36.9 -36.5 -35.0 1.2 0.7 -16.6 -17.7
Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
a. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  Appendix Figure 1: 
 













































































































































Sources: PWT data (1960-2000) are RGDPCH from Penn World Tables 6.1 (2002);
WDI data (1975-2004) are GDP.PCAP.PP.KD from World Development Indicators (2006).  
 
 
Appendix Figure 2: 
FAO Food Production Indexes for Senegal 
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Appendix Figure 3: 













Source:  Authors' calculations from FAO (2006) data.  
 
Appendix Figure 4: 
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Appendix Figure 5: 































































Appendix Figure 6: 



















































Net exports of crude fert. (phosphates)
Consumption of all fertilizers 
Net exports of manufactured fertilizers
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Appendix Figure 7: 





































































Groundnuts (in shell) Millet
Sources:  For 1885/86-1929/30, from Bonnefond and Couty (1991) who cite Vanhaeverbeke (1970).  For 1930-60, from 




Appendix Figure 8: 
Real Farmgate Prices, 1967-2004 
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Appendix Figure 9: 
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1979     Introduction of VAT 
      Abolition of export taxes except on groundnut products and phosphates 
      Reform of entry duties to a three-tier structure: customs duty, tax duty and 
VAT, with four rates of tax duty.  
 
1980     Increase in customs duty from 5 to 10 percent (March) and then 15 percent 
(Sept.) 
 
1986-88     Nouvelle Politique Industrielle (NPI), adjustment of import taxes 
 
1990-91     Generalization of VAT, return to ad valorem import taxes 
 
1992     Reform of the general tax code 
 
1994    Devaluation of the FCFA (12 January) 
      West Africa Monetary Union (WAMU) becomes West Africa Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU), adding regional trade integration 
component. 
      Rice market reform begins (June), with sale of SAED/URIC rice mills and 
end of CPSP handling of local rice. 
 
1995      CPSP closes interior rice warehouses, ending subsidies on transport to 
them (June) 
      Private sector authorized to import broken rice; sourcing from India and 
elsewhere cause Dakar prices to decline by year-end (September)     
     CPSP is dissolved (December). 
 
2002    Adoption of the WAEMU Common External Tariff 
 
 
Sources: Barthelemy, Seck and Vourc’h (1996, pp. 122-23), Wilcock et al. (1997, p. 5) 
and WTO (2003). 
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Appendix Table 2: Annual distortion estimates, Senegal, 1961 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products  
(percent) 
   Cotton  Groundnut  Millet  Rice  All covered  
1961  na -24  0  8 -18 
1962  na -19  0  10 -14 
1963  na -20  0  8 -15 
1964  na -16  0  12 -11 
1965  na -16  0  23 -11 
1966  na -18  0  12 -11 
1967  na -11  0 -13  -9 
1968 na -9  0  -18 -6 
1969  na -32  0 -10 -22 
1970 -39 -36  0  15 -21 
1971 -49 -29  0  31 -23 
1972 -49 -39  0  29 -26 
1973 -69 -53  0 -26 -43 
1974 -34 -64  0 -60 -53 
1975 -45 -45  0  5 -35 
1976 -62 -39  0  42 -29 
1977 -45 -40  0  40 -23 
1978 -55 -52  0  12 -40 
1979 -45 -62  0  52 -40 
1980 -46 -67  0  4 -43 
1981 -41 -65  0 -24 -54 
1982  -56 -9  0 17 -6 
1983 -70 -30  0  3 -17 
1984 -65 -52  0  33 -32 
1985  0 -42  0  68 -16 
1986 -8 -9  0  142  5 
1987  -15 26  0  172 28 
1988  -12  9  0 73 13 
1989 -39 -21  0  42  -4 
1990 -27 -13  0 102  6 
1991 -6  -12  0  162  4 
1992 22 17  0  147 18 
1993 10 16  0  142 31 
1994 -54 -34  0  32 -26 
1995 -42 -15  0  10 -12 
1996  -31 -9  0  1 -8 
1997 -38 -18  0 -14 -12 
1998  -12 -5  0  2 -3 
1999 -10 -21  0  -9 -15 
2000 -30 -35  0  6 -24 
2001  -5 -34  0  -1 -22 
2002 -16 -20  0  11  -8 
2003  -23 -2  0 13 -1 
2004 24  -14  0  1 -5 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Senegal, 1961 to 2004 (b) 
Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable and 
import-competing agricultural industries, and relative
b to non-agricultural industries   
   (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1961 0  -18 3  -12 -22 22 -16 11  -25
1962 0  -14 3 -9 -18 18 -12 10  -20
1963 0  -15 3  -10 -19 20 -13 12  -22
1964 0  -11 3 -7 -16 20 -10 11  -19
1965 0  -11 3 -6 -16 24 -9 12  -19
1966 0  -11 3 -7 -18 21 -10 12  -20
1967 0  -9 3 -5 -11 7 -7 11  -17
1968 0  -6 3 -3 -9 10 -5 11  -15
1969 0  -22 3  -14 -29 14 -21 12  -29
1970 0  -21 3  -14 -32 19 -22 10  -29
1971 0  -23 3  -15 -27 25 -20 11  -28
1972 0  -26 3  -18 -35 20 -27 10  -33
1973 0  -43 3  -30 -47 9 -39 9  -44
1974 0  -53 3  -36 -57 -2 -47 12  -53
1975 0  -35 3  -24 -40 14 -32 9  -37
1976 0  -29 3  -20 -35 23 -26 9  -32
1977 0  -23 3  -16 -36 28 -23 11  -31
1978 0  -40 4  -27 -47 25 -35 15  -43
1979 0  -40 3  -27 -55 31 -40 12  -46
1980 0  -43 3  -30 -57 11 -43 8  -47
1981 0  -54 3  -37 -57 5 -47 9  -52
1982 0  -6 3 -3 -11 20 -5 11  -14
1983 0  -17 3  -11 -28 10 -16 10  -24
1984 0  -32 3  -22 -46 24 -29 8  -35
1985 0  -16 4  -10 -37 49 -15 14  -25
1986 0  5 3  5 -9 65 8 11  -3
1987 0 28 4  21 17 84 33 13  17
1988 0 13 3  10 4 47 17 10  7
1989 0  -4 4 -2 -20 36 -2 13  -14
1990 0  6 3  5 -13 61 9 12  -3
1991 0  4 3  4 -12 71 7 12  -5
1992 0 18 3  14 11 67 26 10  15
1993 0 31 3  23 13 79 26 10  15
1994 0  -26 3  -17 -32 27 -20 11  -27
1995 0  -12 3 -7 -15 15 -8 10  -17
1996 0  -8 3 -5 -10 8 -5 9  -13
1997 0  -12 3 -7 -17 2 -12 9  -19
1998 0  -3 3 -1 -6 14 -2 11  -12
1999 0  -15 3  -10 -19 4 -13 9  -20
2000 0  -24 3  -16 -31 15 -22 10  -29
2001 0  -22 3  -15 -30 10 -21 10  -28
2002 0  -8 3 -4 -19 19 -8 12  -18
2003 0  -1 3  1 -5 20 1 13  -10
2004 0  -5 3 -3 -13 13 -5 12  -15
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Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Senegal, 1961 to 2004: (c) 
Value shares of primary production of covered
c and non-covered products, (percent) 
   Cotton  Groundnut  Millet  Rice  Non-covered  
1961 na 55 14  1 30 
1962 na 52 16  2 30 
1963 na 53 14  2 30 
1964 na 50 17  3 30 
1965 na 50 17  3 30 
1966 na 46 20  4 30 
1967 na 49 14  7 30 
1968 na 36 29  4 30 
1969 na 46 19  4 30 
1970  0 41 26  3 30 
1971  1 56 12  2 29 
1972  1 47 21  1 30 
1973  2 54 13  2 29 
1974  1 54 12  4 30 
1975  0 55 12  2 30 
1976  1 53 14  3 30 
1977  1 44 21  4 30 
1978  1 55 10  5 30 
1979  1 48 19  3 30 
1980  1 45 19  6 30 
1981  1 56 10  4 30 
1982  2 43 20  5 30 
1983  2 36 21 11 29 
1984  2 46 13  9 29 
1985  1 43 17 10 30 
1986  1 36 29  5 30 
1987  1 39 25  6 30 
1988  1 30 30  9 30 
1989  1 35 22 12 30 
1990  1 29 32  8 30 
1991  1 35 30  4 30 
1992  1 28 36  5 30 
1993  2 60  0  8 30 
1994  2 59  0  9 29 
1995  2 57  0 11 29 
1996  3 55  0 13 29 
1997  2 35 25  9 30 
1998  0 42 21  7 30 
1999  0 47 15  8 30 
2000  0 48 16  5 30 
2001  1 46 17  7 30 
2002  1 30 30  8 30 
2003  2 42 20  7 30 
2004  1 31 28 10 30 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
c. At farmgate undistorted prices, US$        Source: Author’s spreadsheet 
   